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1 Introduction
The integration of market economies progresses unevenly across industries. In regulated
markets, due to increasing returns to scale and the incumbency advantage, the main play-
ers of integrated markets are the top performers of the former national monopolies. For
instance, in the European electricity market, economic liberalization has generated a wave
of mergers and acquisitions so that two thirds of the European market is in the hands of
eight large companies (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).1 In theory, public intervention should
mitigate the consequences of firms’ market power and ensure that the efficiency gains
generated by the reforms are passed along to consumers and taxpayers. However, mar-
ket imperfections are harder to handle in an integrated market than in a closed economy
because integration implies a loss of control for the national regulators. Economic integra-
tion removes barriers to trade so that the relevant market is regional, while regulation still
acts nationally. In the absence of a legitimate supranational authority to regulate prices,
production quantities or investment, competition among countries for the sector rents
yields inefficiencies. The present paper addresses the problems posed by infrastructure
investment in liberalized regulated markets. It first analyzes the welfare implications of an
imperfect integration of regulated industries. It next studies how coordination problems
between independent regulators affect supranational investments, such as interconnection
facilities or infrastructures for the common market. Examples from the electricity sector
illustrate the analysis. World electricity demand is projected to double by year 2030. The
total cumulative investment in power generation, transmission and distribution necessary
to meet this rise in demand is estimated to be $11.3 trillion (see International Electric-
ity Agency, 2006). This amount covers investment in fast-growing developing countries,
such as India and China. It also covers investments in OECD countries where ageing
facilities need to be replaced and new facilities need to be built. Finally, it covers invest-
ments necessary to relieve the acute power penury experienced by some of the world’s
poorest nations, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The problem of how to finance the
amount of capital required for these various investments is daunting. The deregulation
1Moreover, among the EU-15, the top three European generation firms have 60% of
the market in ten different countries (European Commission 2007, Energy Sector Enquiry).
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html
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and liberalization waves that swept throughout the world in the 1980s and the 1990s have
eroded governments’ ability to tax industry rents and to subsidize infrastructure deploy-
ment. In the logic of the reform, the private sector was to be the substitute provider of
investment capital previously committed by public/regulated industry. However, in de-
veloping countries, private investment flows dried up after the collapse of Enron and the
Asian financial crisis. In advanced economies, liberalized electricity markets that have
not been accompanied by regulated capacity markets do not generate enough revenues to
support investment in new generating capacity (Joskow, 2006). Power capacity reserve
margins are hence falling in all OECD countries, a signal of under investment. In this
context market integration may allow a better use of existing resources and infrastruc-
tures. Without cross-border trade, countries are obliged to rely on much more expensive
sources of generation in order to respond to a growing demand. Cost complementarities
constitute the engine of integration in the EU electricity market, in the Greater Mekong
Subregion (GMS), in North, Central and South American electricity regional markets2
and in Africa.3 Market integration may also allow the realization of projects that are not
achievable by an isolated country. For instance less than a third of hydropower poten-
tial is currently exploited (mostly in advanced economies), because major hydroelectric-
generation facilities are generally oversized for a single country. For West Africa, Sparrow
et al. (2002) estimate between 5 and 20% the potential cost reduction associated with
market integration (the estimation refers to the cost of expansion of the thermal and
hydroelectric capacities). Despite the potential benefits of market integration, sovereign
countries focus on domestic welfare and tend to favor policy of energy independence.
Most countries rely on public/mixed firms and regulation, to achieve these goals. Former
national monopolies are generally under direct government control, while new entrants
are not. In OECD countries, asymmetric regulation is hence the norm in electricity and
Telecommunication markets (see Flacher and Jennequin, 2008).4 The paper shows that
2Central American nations, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica, have
established a common regulatory body, the Regional Commission of Electricity Interconnection (CRIE).
3In Africa there are several power pool: South African power pool (SAPP), West African power pool
(WAPP), Central African Power Pool (CAPP), East African Power Pool (EAPP) and interconnection
initiatives in North Africa with ties to the Middle East.
4In Europe, the Commission promotes the formation of an integrated market. However, in markets
that are not competitive, the European Union allows national regulators to control operators with sig-
nificant market power. Governments and national regulators retain jurisdiction over specific choices,
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market integration has complex welfare implications in non-competitive industries con-
trolled by national regulators. To be more specific, when the cost difference between
two national champions is small, competition for market share is fierce. Prices decrease
in both countries so that transfers rise. By eroding the rent extracted from the regu-
lated sector, competition reduces the possibility of performing taxation via regulation.
This is the case when the negative business-stealing effect out-weighs the efficiency gains:
welfare decreases in both regions following integration. By contrast, market integration
is welfare-enhancing when the cost difference is large between the two regions. First,
if the foreign firm is significantly less efficient than the national firm, the benefits from
increased export profit (due to the possibility of serving also foreign demand) increase
total welfare in the exporting country. Second, if the foreign firm is significantly more
efficient than the national firm, the inefficient country can benefit from the reduction in
price caused by competition, which enhances consumer welfare in the importing country.
Even when the efficiency gains from integration are large enough so that both countries
win from integration, opposition might still subsist internally. Indeed, market integration
has redistributive effects. For instance, given small levels of opportunity cost for pub-
lic funds, prices converge at some “average” of the closed-economy prices. Consumers
in the formerly low-price region are thus worse off after integration. The paper next
studies investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment. Compared to
autarky, market integration is shown to improve the incentives to invest in cost-reducing
technology. First, when one country is much more efficient than the other, a case where
integration is particularly appealing, the level of sustainable investment increases with
market liberalization. Moreover, the incentives to invest in obsolete technology decrease,
and the incentives to invest in efficient technology increase. Supranational competition,
by stimulating investment in more efficient generation sources, hence reduces some of
the inefficiencies arising in closed economies. Nevertheless, the global level of investment
remains suboptimal because the country endowed with the low-cost technology does not
fully internalize the foreign country consumers’ surplus (i.e., it only internalizes sales).
while respecting the overall framework designed by the Commission. United States and Canadian reg-
ulators impose asymmetric interconnection obligations on incumbent firms, which are also required to
unbundle and share network components. For instance, during the California deregulation experiment
(significantly revised after the crisis of 2001), a ceiling was imposed on the retail price that incumbent
suppliers charged for electricity.
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Second, when the two countries’ technologies are not sufficiently differentiated, in the
open economy the firms have to fight for their market shares. They might overinvest
compared to the optimal solution. By contrast, there is systematic under-investment
in infrastructures that provide a public good, such as interconnection or transportation
facilities. Free-riding behavior reduces the incentives to invest, and business stealing re-
duces the capacity of financing new investment, especially in the importing country. The
problem is sometimes so severe that global investment decreases, compared to autarky.
That is, when the two firms are not sufficiently differentiated in terms of productivity,
the maximal level of investment in public-good facilities is not only suboptimal, but it
is also smaller than under a closed economy. Business-stealing worsens the gap between
the optimal investment level and the equilibrium one. Even when market enlargement
increases the incentives to invest, which occurs when the two countries have significantly
different productivity, the investment level remains suboptimal. The underinvestment
problem has important policy implication. For instance, several programs supported by
the World Bank in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri-Lanka have failed because of this prob-
lem. The Bank supported lending to generators through the Energy Fund, in the spirit of
Public Private Partnerships. Investment in generation was made and the production of
kilowatts rose. However, due to poor transmission and distribution infrastructures, the
plants were kept well-below efficient production levels. On the one hand, power consump-
tion stagnated because power was largely stuck at production sites. On the other hand,
public subsidies to the industry rose because generation investment had been committed
under take-or-pay Power Purchase Agreements (see Manibog and Wegner, 2003). In the
end both consumers and taxpayers were worse off.
1.1 Relationship with the literature
Starting with the seminal paper of Brander and Spencer (1983), the literature on the
interaction between regulation and market integration considers the strategic effect of
trade subsidization policies.5 Subsidies have a rent-shifting effect that makes the do-
mestic firm more aggressive in the common market. The increase in the national profits
5For more details about the strategic trade policy literature, see Brander (1997).
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compensates for the value of subsidies. The strategic reaction of the rival government
creates a prisoner’s dilemma, with the consequence that countries stand to benefit from
jointly reducing the subsidies. Brainard and Martimort (1996, 1997) show that the losses
associated with the prisoner’s dilemma can be mitigated in the case of asymmetric infor-
mation, because competition reduces the agency costs of regulation. Combes, Caillaud,
and Jullien (1997) add domestic production and national consumers to the analysis. In
the absence of a budget constraint for the government, they show that market integra-
tion is always welfare-improving and subsidization desirable.6 By contrast, when public
funds are costly, Collie (2000) shows that subsidization policies can lead to welfare losses,
offering a theoretical argument for their prohibition.
Since it focuses on investment issues, the present paper also relates to the work of
Haaland and Kind (2008), which looks at R&D subsidies for national firms competing
in a third market. Haaland and Kind (2008) concentrate on the strategic motive for
subsidies: governments could pay excessive subsidies in order to strengthen the position
of the national firm in the common market. In a similar framework, Leahy and Neary
(Forthcoming) find that subsidies could end up being too low, rather than excessive, if
investment has positive spillovers (i.e. investment also increases the profits of the ri-
val), and particularly if the social planner takes consumer welfare into account. Both
papers follow the classical trade-policy approach in the sense that they concentrate on
the strategic effect of unit subsidies when public funds are not costly. By contrast, the
present paper analyzes the interaction between regulatory and investment policies in open
economies. As in Leahy and Neary (Forthcoming), we distinguish between different types
of investments with different impacts on a competitor’s costs and profits (i.e., transporta-
tion/interconnection infrastructures and generation technologies). The investments have
to be financed either by consumers or by taxpayers. To find the right balance between the
two, we take into account the opportunity cost of public funds. Taxation by regulation
hence emerges when public funds are costly. The optimal regulated price is a Ramsey
tariff. Unregulated competition can have the adverse effect of undermining the tax base
(Armstrong and Sappington, 2005).7 Market integration erodes the possibility of con-
6As Neary (1994) shows, when public funds are costly and lump sum transfers not allowed, the optimal
unit subsidy can be negative (i.e. an export tax), even in the case of quantity competition.
7As a consequence, taxation by regulation has to be replaced by other fiscal policies (e.g. targeted
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ducting taxation via regulation because regulators do not control foreign firms. They
can tax and subsidize domestic firms more easily, especially in case of public or mixed
ownership.
Thus, the relevant setting is that of incomplete or asymmetric regulation: national
regulators control only domestic firms. The literature includes Caillaud (1990), who stud-
ies a regulated market in which a dominant incumbent is exposed to competition from an
unregulated, competitive fringe, operating under asymmetric information and cost corre-
lation. He shows that competition has a positive effect on overall efficiency and helps to
reduce the rent of the regulated firm. In Caillaud (1990), the competitive fringe prices at
marginal cost. Biglaiser and Ma (1995) extend the analysis to the case where a dominant
regulated firm is exposed to competition from a single strategic competitor. Allowing
for horizontal and vertical differentiation, they find that competition helps to extract the
information rent of the regulated firm, but allocative inefficiency arises in equilibrium.
Both papers focus on new entry into a closed economy. More recently, Calzolari and
Scarpa (Forthcoming) have studied (in a model with costless transfers) the optimal reg-
ulation of a firm that is a monopoly at home but competes abroad with a foreign firm.
Since market integration is a process of reciprocal market opening, Biancini (2008) has
extended the analysis to the case where the unregulated entrant is the incumbent of the
foreign market, showing that differences in production technologies can be an engine of
integration.
The present paper also considers the possibility of the national leader being challenged
in its formerly protected national market and simultaneously trying to expand its activity
in the foreign market. Integration is represented by a removal of barriers to trade, which
leads to price convergence, while regulation is asymmetric (i.e., it remains national as
in liberalized electricity markets). We show that integration has asymmetric effects on
countries. For instance welfare can decrease in one country, while it increases in the
other one. In general, the country with a more efficient technology (lower production
costs) gains more from integration. This result is reminiscent of a result obtained by
Ganuza and Hauk (2004) in the context of procurement. They study integration (i.e.,
subsidies to the industry). These other policies do not come without a cost. Gasmi, Laffont, and Sharkey
(1999, 2000) show that in considering the example of telecommunications cross subsidies remains a
powerful tool for financing universal service under competition in developing countries.
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the institution of a common legislation regulating procurement auctions) in the presence
of corrupted bureaucrats. In their model, countries differ in the level of corruption and
of productive efficiency. They show that integration generally reduces corruption and
increases global welfare. However, if countries have the same productive efficiency, the
less corrupted country could be a loser of the integration process. This negative effect on
the less corrupted country can be offset by a difference in efficiency, increasing the set of
parameters for which a union is possible.8
2 A model of market integration with regulated firms
We consider two symmetrical countries, identified by i = 1, 2. The inverse demand in
each country is given by:
pi = d−Qi (1)
Where Qi is the home demand in country i = 1, 2. Before market integration, there is
a monopoly in each country. In a closed economy, Qi corresponds thus to qi, the quantity
produced by the national monopoly, also identified by i ∈ {1, 2}. When markets are
integrated, Qi can be produced by both firms 1 and 2 (i.e. Qi = qii + qji, i 6= j, where
qij , is the quantity sold by firm i in country j). Total demand in the integrated market
is given by:
p = d− Q
2
(2)
where Q = Q1 +Q2 is the total demand in the integrated market, which can be satisfied
by firm 1 or 2 (i.e. Q = q1 + q2).
On the production side, firm i = 1, 2 incurs a fixed cost K, which measures the
economies of scale in the industry. The fixed cost K is sunk so that it does not play a
role in the optimal production choices. The firm also incurs a variable cost function given
by:
c(θi, qi) = θiqi + γ
q2i
2
. (3)
Contrary to Biancini (2008), who focused on constant marginal cost, the variable cost
function includes a linear and a convex (quadratic) term. The firms’ linear cost parameter
8This happens in Ganuza and Hauk (2004) if the less efficient countries is also more corrupted.
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θi represents a production cost. The quadratic term, which is weighted by the parameter
γ, is interpreted as a transportation cost. Indeed the cost function (3) can be generated
from an horizontal differentiation model in which Firm 1 is located at the left extremity
and Firm 2 at the right extremity of the unit interval. The final price is uniform and
firms have to cover the transportation cost.9 For example, in the case of electricity, θi can
be interpreted as a generation cost, constant after some fixed investment, K, has been
done, while γ is a measure of transportation costs (i.e., transport charges and losses).
The transportation costs are increasing with the distance.
In what follow we assume that γ and θi are common knowledge. Since γ is a common
value, the regulator can implement some yardstick competition to learn freely its value
in case of asymmetric information. By contrast if the regulator does not observe the
independent cost parameter θi, some rent has to be abandoned to the producer in order
to extract this information. The cost parameter then is replaced by the virtual cost (i.e.,
production cost plus information rent). Our results are unchanged except for the inflated
cost parameter.10 For the sake of simplicity we focus on the symmetric information case.
Any distortions occurring at the equilibrium can thus be ascribed to a coordination failure
between the national regulators.
The profit of firm i = 1, 2 is
Πi = P (Q)qi − θiqi − γ q
2
i
2
−K − ti (4)
where ti is the tax it pays to the government (it is a subsidy if it is negative). The
participation constraint of the regulated firm is:
Πi ≥ 0 (5)
The regulator of country i has jurisdiction over the national monopoly i. She regulates
the firm and is allowed to transfer funds from and to it. In particular she taxes operating
9That is, each consumer, who are uniformly distributed over [0, 1], consumes one unit of the good if
their constant valuation for it is higher than the price. Transportation cost associated with a consumer
located at q ∈ [0, 1] is γq for firm 1 and γ(1− q) for firm 2. The variable production cost of firm i with
market share equal to qi can then be written c(θi, qi) =
∫ qi
0 (θi+γ q)dq, or equivalently ci(qi) = θiqi+γ
q2i
2
(i = 1, 2).
10Market integration can reduce the distortion related to the information rent and thus the virtual
cost, for instance through yardstick competition (e.g., Caillaud (1990)). However, Calzolari and Scarpa
(Forthcoming) and Biancini (2008) show that this is not always the case. International competition
sometime increases the distortion related to asymmetric information.
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profits when they are positive. For simplicity, one can think of public ownership. Indeed
in the case of electricity public and mixed firms are still key players in most countries. For
instance Electricite´ de France (EDF), which is one of the largest exporter of electricity in
the world, is owned at 87.3% by the French government. In 2007 the firm has paid more
than EUR 2.4 billion in dividend to the government. However the paper assumptions
are also consistent with the imposition of taxes on the rents made by private firms. For
instance the outcry concerning the windfall gains to shareholders in the privatization of
the UK electricity sector helped Tony Blair’s Labour party regain power. It also led
to the imposition of a special tax on the profit of the shareholders (see Birdsall and
Nellis, 2003).11 In contrast the regulator of country i does not control the production,
the investment nor the profit of firm j (i.e. she does not size the rents, nor subsidize the
loss, of firm j). Rents extraction does not apply to foreign firms because they do not
report their profits locally. For instance between 1996 and 2000, 71% of foreign-based
firms operating in the U.S. paid no U.S. income taxes (United States General Accounting
Office, 2004). The assumption that firm j production and investment decisions escape
regulator i control is consistent with the situation of asymmetric regulation prevailing in
liberalized network industries.
Each utilitarian regulator maximizes the home welfare, given by the surplus of na-
tional consumers plus the profit of the national firm minus the opportunity cost of pub-
lic transfers. The welfare in country i is Wi = S(Qi) − P (Q) Qi + Πi + (1 + λ)ti,
where the consumer surplus function is S(Qi) =
∫ Qi
0
pi(Q)dQ = dQi − Q
2
i
2
. Substituting
ti = P (Q)qi− θiqi− γ q
2
i
2
−K −Πi from (4) in the function Wi it is easy to check that Wi
is decreasing in Πi when λ ≥ 0. Since leaving rents to the monopoly is socially costly,
the regulator always binds the participation constraint of the national firm (5): Πi = 0.
The utilitarian welfare function in country i = 1, 2 is
Wi = S(Qi)− P (Q) Qi + (1 + λ)P (Q)qi − (1 + λ)(θiqi + γ q
2
i
2
+K) (6)
11Taxation by regulation, which is a substitute for direct taxation, has always existed in countries
where regulated firms were private (mainly the USA). For instance a federal excise tax on local and long
distance telephony US services was created in 1898. It has been repealed occasionally and re-enacted
ever since. The tax’s opponents argue that it is regressive and distortive, while its proponents insist on
the need for revenues. It is hard to get around this argument: at a tax rate of 3% tax collection reached
USD 5.185 billions in fiscal year 1999 (reported in budget of the United States Government, fiscal year
2000).
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Term λ ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the shadow price of the government budget con-
straint. It captures the idea that public funds are raised through distortive taxation.
Abandoning a positive subsidy to a regulated firm creates distortions in other sectors.
Conversely, when the transfer is positive (i.e. taxes on profits), it helps to reduce dis-
tortive taxation or to finance investment. The assumption of costly public funds is a
way of capturing the general equilibrium effects of sectoral intervention. We assume that
both countries have the same cost of public funds λ.12 In what follows, it is convenient
to express the results in function of λ
1+λ
. Let
Λ =
λ
1 + λ
. (7)
It is straightforward to check that Λ increases with λ so that Λ ∈ [0, 1] when λ ∈
[0,+∞). We first briefly study the benchmark case of a closed economy.
2.1 Closed Economy
In a closed economy, marked C, each regulator maximizes expected national welfare (6)
with respect to the quantity subject to the autarky production condition Qi = qi. Solving
this problem the optimal autarky quantity is:
qCi =
d− θi
1 + γ + Λ
(8)
We deduce that the autarky price is P (qCi ) = θi+ (Λ+ γ)
d−θi
1+γ+Λ
. When Λ = 0, public
funds are costless and the price is equal to the marginal cost P (qCi ) = θi+γq
C
i . When Λ >
0, the price is raised above the marginal cost with a rule which is inversely proportional
to the elasticity of demand (Ramsey pricing): P (qCi ) = θi + γ q
C
i + Λ
P (qCi )
ε
. The optimal
pricing rule diverges from marginal cost pricing proportionally to the opportunity cost
of pubic fund Λ because the revenue of the regulated firm allows to decrease the level of
other transfers in the economy (and thus distortive taxation).
12Studying the case of asymmetric λs is possible in a fully linear model (i.e., see Biancini (2008)).
However considering asymmetric λs in a more general framework is challenging because both the equi-
librium quantities and the welfare function are non linear functions of λ. Nevertheless some local results
can be drawn: increasing the cost of public funds of one country generally increases the negative impact
of business stealing and thus decreases its gains from trade. Conversely, the country with a relatively
lower λ benefits more from market integration, which generally increases its willingness to invest.
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3 Market integration
When barriers to trade are removed, firms can serve consumers in both countries. We
first consider the solution that would be chosen by a global welfare maximizing social
planner. This theoretical benchmark describes a process of integration in which the two
countries are fully integrated, even fiscally.
3.1 The Global Optimum
The supranational utilitarian social planner has no national preferences. He maximizes
the sum of welfare function (6), marked W =W1 +W2,
W = S(Q1) + S(Q2) + λP (Q)Q− (1 + λ)(θ1q1 + γ q
2
1
2
+ θ2q2 + γ
q22
2
+ 2K) (9)
with respect to quantities (Q1, Q2, q1, q2), under the constraint that consumption Q =
Q1 +Q2 equals production q1 + q2. This problem can be solved sequentially. First of all,
the optimal consumption sharing rule between the two countries (Q1, Q2) is computed for
any level of production Q. This amounts to maximize S(Q1)+S(Q2) under the constraint
that Q1 +Q2 = Q. Since S(Qi) = dQi − Q
2
i
2
we deduce easily the next result.
Lemma 1 Whatever (q1, q2) chosen at the production stage, at the consumption stage it
is optimal to set Q1 = Q2 =
q1+q2
2
.
By virtue of Lemma 1 the supranational utilitarian objective function (9) becomes
W = 2S(q1+q2
2
) + λP (q1 + q2)(q1 + q2)− (1 + λ)(θ1q1 + γ q
2
1
2
+ θ2q2 + γ
q22
2
+ 2K) (10)
Let θmin = min{θ1, θ2} and ∆ = θ2 − θ1 be the difference in cost parameters between
producer 2 and producer 1. It can be positive or negative. Optimizing (10) with respect
to the quantities q1 and q2 yields the following result.
Proposition 1 The socially optimal quantity is:
Q∗ =


2
1+Λ+2γ
(d− θmin) produced by a monopoly if |∆| > ∆∗(θmin) = 2γ(d−θmin)1+2γ+Λ
2
1+Λ+γ
(d− θ1+θ2
2
) produced by a duopoly otherwise.
(11)
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The quantity produced by firm i = 1, 2 at the duopoly solution is:
q∗i =
Q∗
2
+
θj − θi
2γ
if |∆| ≤ ∆∗(θmin) (12)
Proof. See Appendix 1.
When the cost difference between the two firms is large (i.e., when |∆| > ∆∗(θmin)) the
less efficient producer is shut down and the most efficient firm is in a monopoly position.
This implies that when there is no transportation cost (i.e., γ = 0), the first best contract
always prescribes to shut down the less efficient firm.13 However the “shut down” result
is upset with the introduction of transportation cost. When γ is positive both firms
produce whenever |∆| ≤ ∆∗(θmin). The market share of firm i = 1, 2 is: q
∗
i
Q∗
= 1
2
+
θj−θi
2γQ∗
.
The most efficient firm (i.e., the firm with the cost parameter θmin) has a larger market
share than its competitor. However, the market share differences decreases with γ.
The supranational social planner exploits the gains from trade to maximize the sum
of national welfare. The common market welfare, W ∗ = W ∗1 +W
∗
2 , is thus higher than
the sum of the two closed economy welfare, WC = WC1 +W
C
2 . Focusing on the interior
solution, which arises when |∆| ≤ ∆∗(θmin), the total welfare in the case of perfect
economic integration W ∗ is obtained by substituting (11) in (10). Similarly, WCi is
computed replacing (8) in (6) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Rearranging terms, one can check that the
welfare gains from integration is:
W ∗ −WC = ∆
2
4γ
1 + Λ
1 + γ(1− Λ) ≥ 0 (13)
The welfare gain in (13) is an increasing function of the cost difference |∆|. The higher
the difference in the production cost the higher are the gains related to the reallocation
of production in the common market. However when γ is large, expanding the produc-
tion of the most efficient firm becomes costly. The gains from trade decrease with the
transportation cost γ.
The solution chosen by a global welfare maximizing social planner corresponds to
perfect integration. In practice, such fusion of regulatory bodies and fiscal systems is
13This corresponds to the linear case studied by Biancini (2008).
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rarely achieved. The German reunification is an exception. The East and West German
economic systems have been unified under the same government. Consistent with the
theory, many firms have been shut down in the East. The reallocation of production
towards more efficient units has been sustained by transfers from the West. However, in
most cases, economic integration excludes fiscal and political institutions, which remain
decentralized at the country level. Sovereign governments and regulators do not share
profits and tariff revenues among themselves; taxpayers enjoy taxation by regulation
insofar as the rents come from their national firms. The next section studies the non-
cooperative outcome of economic integration given asymmetric regulation.
3.2 The Non Cooperative Equilibrium
In the open economy, marked O, there is a single price. Since the demand functions
are symmetric this implies that the level of consumption is the same in the two coun-
tries: Qi =
1
2
QO, i = 1, 2. By contrast the cost functions are different, which implies
different level of production in the two countries. National regulators simultaneously fix
the quantity produced by the national firm through the regulatory contract, qOi , maxi-
mizing expected national welfare (6). The system of reaction functions of the regulators
determine the non cooperative equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 2 The quantity produced at the non cooperative equilibrium of the open
economy is:
QO =


4
3+4γ+Λ
(d− θmin) by a monopoly if |∆| > ∆O(θmin) = 2(1+2γ)(d−θmin)3+4γ+Λ ;
4
2(1+γ)+Λ
(d− θ1+θ2
2
) by a duopoly otherwise.
(14)
The quantity produced by firm i = 1, 2 at the duopoly solution is:
qOi =
QO
2
+
θj − θi
1 + 2γ
if |∆| ≤ ∆O(θmin) (15)
Proof. See Appendix 2.
When |∆| > ∆O(θmin), the less efficient producer shuts down. The quantity in (14)
is thus a function of the low cost parameter θmin. Comparing equations (14) and (11)
the equilibrium solution implies the shut down of the less efficient firm less often than
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the socially optimal solution. That is, ∆O(θmin) ≥ ∆∗(θmin) ∀θmin ∈ [θ, θ]. This result
is illustrated Figure 2. The dotted lines represent the equilibrium shut down threshold
of the less efficient firm in the integrated market with independent regulators. The solid
lines represent the optimal threshold.14
Figure 1: Shut down threshold of the less efficient firm. Solid line: optimal threshold, Dotted
line: non-cooperative equilibrium.
Comparing the quantities produced in the common market with the quantities pro-
duced in a closed economy, it is straightforward to check that QO defined equation (14)
is always larger than QC = qC1 +q
C
2 defined equation (8). The fact that the total quantity
increases under market integration does not necessarily imply a welfare improvement.
Indeed when |∆| ≤ ∆∗(θmin), it is easy to check that QC = Q∗ defined equation (11). We
deduce that excessive production occurs in the common market. To be more specific let
compare the production of firm i = 1, 2 in the common market with its production under
closed economy. Substituting QO from equation (14) in equation (15) and comparing it
14The figure is plotted for d = 1, λ = 0.3, γ = 0.5, θi ∈ [0, 1] with ∆∗ = ∆∗(0) and ∆O = ∆O(0). The
same shape is obtained for any support such as θ − θ > 2γ(d−θmin)1+2γ+Λ .
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with equation (8), yields:
qOi > q
C
i ⇔ θj − θi ≥ −
Λ(d− θi)(1 + γ)
(1 + γ + Λ)2
j 6= i i = 1, 2 (16)
When Λ = 0, the quantity produced by the national firm is increased with respect to the
quantity produced in a closed economy if and only if the foreign firm is less efficient (i.e.,
if θj − θi > 0). In this case, the foreign monopoly leaves some space to the more efficient
competitor and consumers enjoy larger surplus. By contrast when Λ > 0 the regulator
might choose to expand the national quantity with respect to the quantity produced
in a closed economy even if the competitor is slightly more efficient. The reason is
that competition decreases the net profits of the national firm without generating drastic
increase in consumers surplus. In a closed economy, the regulator chooses a small quantity
to enjoy high Ramsey margin. However, in the open economy, the Ramsey margin is
eroded by competition and producing such a small quantity is no longer optimal. It only
reduces the market share of the domestic firm. In his attempt to mitigate the business
stealing effect the regulator increases the quantity of the domestic firm.
Comparing QO and Q∗ hence yields
QO ≥ Q∗ ⇔ |∆| ≤ ∆O/∗(θmin) = (2γ+Λ)(d−θmin)1+2γ+Λ . (17)
When |∆| is smaller than ∆O/∗(θmin), the business stealing effect is strong. Regula-
tors fight to maintain their market shares by boosting domestic production. Aggregate
quantities are then larger in the common market than at the optimum. Symmetrically,
when |∆| is large the regulator of the most efficient country controls a large market share
(the firm even becomes a monopolist in the common market when |∆| > ∆O(θmin)). The
problem is that she does not internalize the welfare of foreign consumers. She chooses a
suboptimal production level, QO < Q∗, whenever |∆| > ∆O/∗(θmin). Figure 2 illustrates
the results. It represents for a given θmin the quantity levels Q
∗, QO and QC in function of
|∆| ∈ [0, d]. The flat sections correspond to the shut down of the less efficient producer.
3.3 Welfare analysis of market integration
Replacing the optimal quantities in the welfare function, we compute the effect of market
integration on welfare.
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Figure 2: Total Quantities Q∗, QO and QC in function of |∆|
Proposition 3 For Λ = 0, market integration increases welfare in both countries. For
any Λ strictly positive, market integration increases welfare in both countries if and only
if the difference in the marginal costs |∆| is large enough.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 3. It shows the welfare gains of country 1 for Λ = 0 and
Λ > 0 respectively. When Λ = 0, taxation by regulation is not an issue and an increase
in |∆| increases the welfare gains identically in the low cost and high cost country. The
less efficient country enjoys lower price while the more efficient country enjoys higher
profits. Business stealing creates no loss because it is compensated by an increase in
consumer surplus in the country with a smaller market share. However, the equilibrium
quantities (14) do not corresponds with the optimal levels (11): not all gains from trade
are exploited. When Λ > 0, the intercept, corresponding to ∆ = 0, is negative, which
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means that if θ1 = θ2 both countries loose from integration. To fight business stealing
both countries increase their quantities. Price is decreased below the optimal monopoly
Ramsey level and taxation by regulation decreases. Yet competition does not increase
efficiency because the firms have the same cost. The net welfare impact is negative for
both countries. The welfare-degradation result of integration established for linear costs
(see for instance Biancini (2008)) is hence robust to the introduction of transportation
costs (i.e., to γ > 0). For ∆ 6= 0 the welfare gains of the two countries are asymmetric.
For the most efficient country the gains are strictly increasing. For the less efficient
country they are U-shaped. The welfare gains are first decreasing and then increasing.
For |∆| big enough, the welfare gains are positive in both countries.
Figure 3: Welfare gains from integration, WO1 −WC1
Remark that ∆ˆ ≥ ∆. It is clear that for ∆ belonging to the interval [−∆,∆], market
integration achieved by two independent jurisdictions is inefficient. Each country welfare
is decreased by integration.15 The region as a whole is better off with the co-existence
of two closed economies. The negative welfare effect arises because of the market share
rivalry between the two countries. It is thus related to the literature on trade and compe-
tition (starting from Brander and Spencer, 1983). In the case of trade policy sustained by
export subsidies, the result arises because of a prisoner dilemma between governments.
15The negative effect of business stealing on welfare, is not related to the assumption of a limited
competition (i.e., duopoly) in the integrated market. Increasing the number of unregulated competitors
would only worsen this effect.
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Both countries would be better off if trade subsidies were forbidden. Here, the result
depends on the negative public finance effect of competition.
For value of |∆| ∈ [∆, ∆ˆ] the most efficient country wins while the less efficient country
loses. If one region loses while the other one wins, there will be resistance to integration.
By contrast welfare is increased in both countries for values of ∆ smaller than −∆ˆ and
larger than ∆ˆ. In other words, the theory predicts that integration will be easier when
the costs difference between the national champions is large.
In addition to the global welfare impact, the creation of an integrated market with
common price P (QO) has redistributive effects. Indeed substituting QO from equation
(14) in the inverse demand function yields the equilibrium price P (QO) =
d(Λ
2
+γ)+
θ1+θ2
2
1+γ+Λ
2
if |∆| ≤ ∆O(θmin). Comparing this price with the price in the closed economy, P (qci ) =
θi + (Λ + γ)
d−θi
1+γ+Λ
, one can check that market integration induces a price reduction in
country i = 1, 2 if and only if the costs difference is not too large. That is,
P (QO) ≤ P (qci ) ⇔ θj − θi ≤
Λ(d− θi)
1 + γ + Λ
j 6= i i = 1, 2 (18)
Price convergence is usually considered positively, because it is a sign of effective
market integration. However, for some countries it can imply that prices are higher after
integration than in the closed economy. Indeed equation (18) shows that if |∆| > Λ(d−θmin)
1+γ+Λ
then the price decreases in the less efficient region and increases in the more efficient one.16
Consumers of the relatively efficient region are then worse off after integration. This can
be a source of social discontent and opposition towards market opening. For instance
the integration of electricity markets is advanced between France and neighbor countries
(Italy, Spain, United Kingdom). The difference between generation costs is the engine of
integration. Countries with high costs (Italy, Spain, UK) benefit from low prices, while
the country at low cost (France) benefits from new profit opportunities. Consistently
with the theory empirical evidence shows prices rise in domestic electricity market of
EU exporting countries, such as France. The interests of the national firm/taxpayers are
conflicting with the interests of the domestic consumers. Market integration increases the
16For instance when Λ = 0 the price in the integrated market is equal to the average marginal cost.
Since the average marginal cost is the average of the prices in the two closed economies, the price increases
in the more efficient country and decreases in the less efficient one.
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profit opportunities of the efficient firm, by increasing the number of potential consumers.
If the government is able to extract a fair share of these new market rents, it can use
this to finance new investments or cross subsidize for the benefit of taxpayers. If the
government is unable to size the firm’s rents, both domestic taxpayers and consumers are
worse off (shareholders are the only winner).17
By contrast if the firms are not drastically different (i.e., if |∆| ≤ Λ(d−θmin)
1+γ+Λ
) prices
decrease in both countries because of the business stealing effect. Benevolent regulators
are willing to increase their transfers to the national firm to sustain low prices so that
taxation by regulation decreases. This result is consistent with Laffont and Tirole (2000)
claim that pro-competitive reforms in telecommunications may have had the effect of
increasing the total transfers paid to the industry. The negative fiscal effect is a major
concern in developing countries where tariffs play an important role in raising funds (see
Laffont, 2005 and Auriol and Picard, 2008). When public funds are scarce and other
sources of taxation are distortive or limited, market integration, which has a negative
impact on taxpayers and on the industry ability to finance new investments, induces
welfare losses.
4 Investment
One of the aims of market integration is to increase the incentives to invest by creating
a larger and more efficient market in regulated industries. However, it is not clear that
the model of integration with asymmetric regulation favored by many regions in the
world, including the European and the African Union, provides an adequate framework
for investment incentives. Unless the costs difference between two regions is large, market
integration can decrease the aggregate capacity of financing new investment. This is a
major concern in electricity because demand is on the rise everywhere, and in many
regions aging generation and transportation facilities need urgently to be upgraded and
expanded. Moreover, specific investment, such as transportation and interconnection
facilities, are required to achieve market integration in emerging markets. For instance
17France is the world’s largest net exporter of electricity due to its low cost of nuclear generation. It
gains over EUR 3 billion per year from this trade. The French, government which is the main shareholder
of EDF, manages to reap a fair share of its profit each year (more than EUR 2 billion in 2007). The
French electricity market is extensively discussed and documented in Finon and Glachant (2008).
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in Sub-Saharan Africa it is estimated that some 26 GW of interconnectors, for a cost of
$ 500 million per year, are lacking for the creation of a regional power-trading market
(Rosnes and Vennemo, 2008). Similarly the vast hydropower potential of the continent
is unexploited because of the lack of investment.18
This section studies the incentive to invest of national firms subjected to asymmetric
regulation. Our analysis focuses on two types of investment. The first type decreases
the transportation cost γ. We refer to this kind of investment as “transportation cost
reducing” or “γ-reducing” investment. In the integrated market the competitor of the
investing firm also benefit from the cost reduction. One can think of investment in
transmission, interconnection, or interoperability facilities. The second type of investment
reduces the production cost of the investing firm. It is referred to as “production cost
reducing” or “θ-reducing” investment. This kind of investment only benefits the national
producer and makes it more aggressive in the common market. In both cases the analysis
focuses on interior solution. Costs difference is assumed to be small enough so that the
production of the two firms is positive in the common market. As illustrated by the
analysis of market integration in Section 3 this assumption is not crucial for the results.19
However it simplifies their exposition.
4.1 Transportation Cost Reducing Investment
We assume that country i = 1, 2 can reduce the collective transportation cost from γ
to tγ with t ∈ (0, 1) by investing a fixed amount Iγ > 0. Since γ-reducing investment
increases the efficiency of all firms, it has a public good nature. Examples are high tension
transportation power lines and cross border interconnection facilities. To rule out corner
solution (i.e., shut down cases) we make the following assumption.
A1 |∆| ≤ ∆∗t (θmin) = 2tγ(d−θmin)1+2tγ+Λ .
Assumption A1 intuitively requires that the difference in firms cost is not too large.
We first consider the level of investment induced by the global welfare maximizer of
Section 3.1. Let q
∗Iγ
i be the quantity produced by firm i = 1, 2 in the case of investment.
18The annualized investment costs required to simply maintain current access rate in SSA (less than
30% of the population) in 2015 are estimated to be around 5 percent of the region GDP.
19They are preserved when shut down cases are considered (computations are available on request).
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The optimal quantities are obtained by substituting tγ in equations (11) and (12). The
gross utilitarian welfare in the case of investment is the welfare function defined equation
(10) evaluated at the actualized quantities: W ∗Iγ = W (q
∗Iγ
1 , q
∗Iγ
2 ). The welfare gain of
the investment, W ∗Iγ −W ∗, has to be compared with the social cost of the investment
(1 + λ)Iγ. The social cost of investment Iγ is weighted by (1 + λ) because devoting
resources to investment decreases the operating profits, thus increasing transfers. The
global welfare maximizer chooses to invest if and only if: W ∗Iγ −W ∗ ≥ (1 + λ)Iγ. Let I∗γ
be the maximal level of investment which satisfy this inequality:
I∗γ =
1
1 + λ
[W ∗Iγ −W ∗] (19)
We next study the non cooperative equilibrium investment level in the case of market
integration. The quantity produced by firm i after investment, q
OIγ
i , is obtained by
substituting tγ in equation (14). Let W
OIγ
i be country i = 1, 2 welfare function (6)
evaluated at (q
OIγ
1 , q
OIγ
2 ). Investment is optimal in country i if and only if W
OIγ
i −WOi ≥
(1 + λ)Iγ . The maximum level of investment that country i is willing to make in the
common market is:
IOγi = max
[
0,
1
1 + λ
[W
OIγ
i −WOi ]
]
(20)
Intuitively transportation cost reducing technology increases the business stealing
effect. Although this has an adverse effect on both countries, the negative impact is
larger for the high cost firm. One can hence check equation (15) that the market share of
the less efficient country decreases after the investment. For this reason, the welfare effect
generated by the transportation cost reducing investment in the less efficient country can
be negative so that IOγi can be equal to zero. In particular, this occur for large values of Λ
(see Appendix 4 for details). By contrast the investment always increases the gross welfare
of the most efficient country. The maximal level of investment for the more efficient firm
(i.e., min{θ1, θ2}), is always positive and higher than the maximal level of investment for
the less efficient one (i.e., max{θ1, θ2}). Since γ-reducing investment benefit equally the
two producers, in the common market the level of investment that each country is willing
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to finance depends on the investment choice of the other country.
Lemma 2 Let I
O
γ be the maximal level of investment for the more efficient firm and I
O
γ
the maximal level of investment for the less efficient one as defined in (20). Then, if
Iγ > I
O
γ there is no investment. If I
O
γ < Iγ ≤ I
O
γ , the more efficient firm invests and the
less efficient one does not. If Iγ ≤ IOγ there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies in
which one of the firm invests and the other does not.20
Proof. See Appendix 4.
By virtue of Lemma 2 the decision of the more efficient firm determines the maxi-
mal equilibrium level of investment attainable in the common market. Comparing the
maximum investment level in open economy with the optimal level yields the following
result.
Proposition 4 In the integrated market the investment level in γ-reducing technology is
always suboptimal:
I
O
γ ≤ I
O
γ + I
O
γ ≤ I∗γ ∀∆,Λ ≥ 0 (21)
Proof. See Appendix 4.
In our specification, γ-reducing investment increases the efficiency of all firms. Since it
reduces the transportation costs both in investing and non-investing countries, a reduction
in γ has a public good nature. It is thus intuitive that investment level I
O
γ is sub-optimal.
The investing country does not take into account the impact of the investment on the
foreign country. However the under-investment problem goes deeper than simple free-
riding. Even if each country was willing to contribute up to the point where the cost of
investment outweighs the welfare gains generated by investment (i.e., without free-riding
on the investment made by the other) the total investment level I
O
γ + I
O
γ would still be
sub-optimal. To analyze the origin of this inefficiency we study countries’ incentives to
invest in a closed economy.
20We focus on pure strategies. Yet there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which firm i, i 6= j invests
with probability pii =
WCIj −(1+λ)Iγ−W
C
j
WCIj −W
C
j
. This equilibrium is inefficient because with positive probability
both firms invest, or alternatively, no firm invests.
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Let q
CIγ
i be the quantity produced by firm i in the case of investment in a closed
economy. It is obtained by substituting tγ in equation (8). Let W
CIγ
i be the country
i = 1, 2 welfare function (6) evaluated at (q
CIγ
1 , q
CIγ
2 ). Investment is optimal in country i
if and only if W
CIγ
i −WCi ≥ (1 + λ)Iγ so that:
ICγi =
1
1 + λ
[W
CIγ
i −WCi ]. (22)
Comparing (22) with (20) yields the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Let I
C
γ be the maximal amount that the most efficient country is willing
to invest to reduce transportation costs in the closed economy and I
O
γ be the maximal
amount it is willing to invest in the common market.
• For Λ = 0, IOγ > I
C
γ ∀∆ ≥ 0 and I
O
γ − I
C
γ is an increasing function of ∆.
• For Λ > 0, there exists ∆˜ > 0 such that IOγ > I
C
γ if and only if |∆| > ∆˜.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Figure 4 illustrates the results of Propositions 4 and 5 for the case Λ > 0. When
public funds are costly, the maximal level of investment sustainable in the open economy
is lower than in the case of autarky if ∆ is small. Indeed investment reduces the costs
of the competitor and makes it more aggressive in the common market. The business
stealing effect, while reducing investing country total welfare, also reduces its capacity to
finance new investment. Market integration may thus generate an insufficient level of γ-
reducing investment for two reasons. The first reason is that investment has a public good
feature. The investing country does not internalize the benefits on foreign stakeholders.
The second reason is that investment decreases the costs of the competitor, worsening
the business stealing effect.
Under market integration, when ∆ is small (i.e., (|∆| ≤ ∆˜), the maximal level of
investment is not only sub-optimal, but it is also smaller than under a closed economy.
When the two regions’ cost are not drastically different business stealing is fierce. It
reduces the capacity of financing new investment worsening the gap between the optimal
investment and the equilibrium level. By contrast when one country has a drastic cost
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Figure 4: γ-reducing investment
θmin is fixed, |∆| varies,
advantage (i.e., |∆| > ∆˜), it is willing to invest more in the common market than under
closed economy because the investment increase its market share and profits. Integration
can then help to increase investment, although not up to the first best level. Similarly
when Λ = 0 public funds are free. Business stealing is no longer a problem so that market
integration increases the level of sustainable investment compared to a closed economy.
4.2 Production Cost Reducing Investment
We next focus on a production cost reducing, or “θ-reducing”, investment. We assume
that this investment is only possible in country 1, because of the availability of a specific
input or technology. For instance in electricity the investment can be the construction of a
dam, which reduces generation cost. Hydropower potential is unevenly distributed across
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countries. Country 1 can reduce the production cost from θ1 to c θ1 (c < 1) by investing a
fixed amount Iθ. We focus on cases in which both firms produce in the common market.
The following assumption ensures that there is no shut down in equilibrium.
A2 |θ2 − cθ1| ≤ 2γ(d−cmin{cθ1,θ2})1+2γ+Λ .
We first consider the solution induced by the global welfare maximizer of Section 3.1.
Let q∗Iθi be the quantity produced by firm i = 1, 2 in the case of θ-reducing investment by
firm 1. The optimal quantities are given by equations (11) and (12) where θ1 is replaced
by cθ1. Substituting the quantities q
∗Iθ
i (i = 1, 2) in the welfare function defined equation
(10), the gross utilitarian welfare is W ∗Iγ = W (q∗Iθ1 , q
∗Iθ
2 ). The global welfare maximizer
regulator invests if and only if W ∗Iθ −W ∗ ≥ (1 + λ)Iθ. Let denote I∗θ the maximal level
of investment which satisfies this inequality:
I∗θ =
1
1 + λ
[W ∗Iθ −W ∗] (23)
We derive next the non cooperative equilibrium quantities in the open economy, qOIθi ,
from equation (14) where θ1 is replaced by cθ1. Substituting the quantities q
OIθ
i (i = 1, 2)
in the welfare function defined equation (10), the gross utilitarian welfare in the case of
investment by firm 1 is WOIγ = W (qOIθ1 , q
OIθ
2 ). Regulator of country 1 invests if and only
if WOIθ −WO ≥ (1 + λ)Iθ. Similarly the quantities in the case of a closed economy are
derived from equation (8) where θ1 is replaced by cθ1. Substituting the quantities q
CIθ
i
(i = 1, 2) in the welfare function defined equation (10), the gross utilitarian welfare in
the case of investment by firm 1 is WCIγ =W (qCIθ1 , q
CIθ
2 ). In a closed economy country 1
invests if and only if WCIθ−WC ≥ (1+λ)Iθ. We deduce the maximal level of investment
that country 1 is willing to commit in the common market and in the closed economy:
Ikθ =
1
1 + λ
[W kIθ1 −W k1 ] k = O,C (24)
Proposition 6 Let I∗θ , and I
C
θ , I
O
θ be defined equation (23) and (24) respectively. Let
∆ = θ2 − θ1. Then, there exist 3 thresholds values ∆ˆ1 = ∆ˆ2 = ∆ˆ3 for Λ = 0, and
∆ˆ1 < ∆ˆ2 < ∆ˆ3 for all Λ > 0 such that ∀ c ∈ (0, 1):
• IOθ > ICθ ⇔ 0 > ∆ > ∆ˆ1.
• I∗θ > ICθ ⇔ 0 > ∆ > ∆ˆ2.
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• I∗θ > IOθ ⇔ ∆ > ∆ˆ3.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Figure 5: θ1-reducing investment
θ1 is fixed; ∆ varies
Figure 5 illustrates the results of Proposition 6 in the case Λ > 0. It is drawn for a
fixed value of cθ1. The static comparative parameter is ∆.
When Λ = 0, business stealing has no adverse impact on national welfare so that
∆ˆ1 = ∆ˆ2 = ∆ˆ3 =
(1−c)θ1
2
. In this case market integration unambiguously reduces the gap
between optimal and equilibrium level of investment. However when Λ > 0, the threshold
∆ˆ1 and ∆ˆ3 shifts to the left and to the right respectively while ∆ˆ2 is not affected (see
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Appendix 6).21 When Λ is large enough ∆3 becomes positive.
In closed economy there is excessive investment if the investing firm is of a relatively
high cost and under-investment otherwise. When the national firm is inefficient (i.e.
∆ < ∆ˆ2 < 0), the only way to increase the level of consumption (and thus total welfare)
in autarky is through the cost reducing investment. In the open economy the market can
be served by the other firm, so that investing to improve the inefficient national technology
is no longer optimal. When ∆ > ∆ˆ2 the autarky equilibrium level of investment is too
low because in the absence of trade the national regulator does not care about country
2. The investment level of country 1 is thus independent of firm 2, which explains the
flat investment shape in Figure 5. Since regulator focuses on domestic consumers surplus
and national firm rent, these inefficiency results are hardly surprising. A more interesting
issue is whether economic integration can improve the autarky outcome or not.
For ∆ > ∆ˆ3 and ∆ < ∆ˆ1 market integration improves the situation with respect to
the closed economy. When ∆ > ∆ˆ3, country 1 chooses a level of investment in autarky
that is too low. Without an access to the foreign market, the investment is oversized for
the domestic demand. Market integration helps to increase the level of investment that
country 1 is willing to sustain by enlarging the market size. Symmetrically, in the closed
economy, when ∆ < ∆ˆ1 country 1 overinvests in marginal improvements of its technology
because it has no access to the foreign technology. In the common market, the national
consumers can be served by the foreign firm at a lower price. Investing to improve the
inefficient national technology is not attractive anymore. Market opening improves the
situation with respect to autarky by reducing the level of wasteful investments. However
it does not restore the first best level. When ∆ > ∆ˆ3 the open market equilibrium of
investment is too low because the investing country does not fully internalize the increase
in the foreign consumer surplus. Symmetrically, when ∆ ≤ ∆ˆ3 the possibility to reduce
its cost gap and to expand its market share by serving foreign consumers makes a high
level of investment attractive. Incentives to invest improve compared to autarky but are
still too high for inefficient firm and too low for efficient one compared to the optimum.
For ∆ˆ1 < ∆ < ∆ˆ2, there is excessive investment both under closed and open economy.
21When Λ increases, all thresholds IOθ , I
∗
θ I
C
θ are shifted downwards because the social cost of invest-
ment increases. However, IOθ decreases less because investment becomes important to reduce business
stealing effect in the common market. As a result, the region of overinvestment increases.
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However the over-investment problem is more severe in the open economy. When ∆ > ∆ˆ1
a production cost reducing investment raises the relative efficiency of the national firm.
It invests to strengthen its position in the common market and to reduce the business
stealing problem. It does not internalize the cost it imposes on country 2 and overinvests.
Markets integration thus improves incentives to invest in cost reducing technologies when
the costs difference between the two regions is large and it leads to over-investment when
the costs difference is small. This is in sharp contrast with transportation infrastructure
investment, where integration leads to under-investment.22
5 Conclusion
Market integration has complex welfare implications in non-competitive industries con-
trolled by national regulators. Unless the difference in production costs between two
regions is large enough, economic integration achieved by sovereign countries is unlikely
to be successful. When the two national champions are not sufficiently differentiated
in terms of productivity, the competition for market shares induced by the integration
process is welfare-degrading in both countries. Even when the efficiency gains from inte-
gration are large enough so that both countries win from integration, opposition might
still subsist internally. Indeed market integration has redistributive effects. For instance,
when the cost difference between the two countries is large enough, the possible adverse
impact of price convergence on consumers in the low-price region will be a source of op-
position and discontent toward the integration process. Integration of market economies
is generally perceived to be a powerful tool in stimulating investment in infrastructure in-
dustries. Intuitively, some investments that are oversized for a particular country should
be profitable in an enlarged market. This paper shows that with cost-reducing tech-
nology, market integration tends indeed to increase the level of sustainable investment.
22When the initial level of costs difference between the two regions is not large enough the business
stealing effect tilts the investment incentives in the wrong direction. For instance if −∆ˆ2 < θ1 − θ2 <
min{∆˜,−∆ˆ2} with ∆˜ being defined Proposition 5, then under market integration country 2 under-invests
in γ-reducing technology while country 1 over-invests in θ-reducing technology. The latter investment
reduces the gap between the two regions production costs, which reduces further the incentives of country
2 to invest in transportation and interconnection facilities. By virtue of Proposition 3 welfare decreases
in both regions.
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When one country is much more efficient than the other, integration stimulates invest-
ment in the cost-reducing technology. However, the investment level remains suboptimal
because the countries endowed with cheap power (e.g., hydropower) do not fully internal-
ize the surplus of the consumers in the foreign countries. They internalize the sales only.
It remains the case that with generation facilities, the only problem to fear, compared
to autarky, is overinvestment. This is in contrast with the systematic underinvestment
problem arising for interconnection and transportation facilities, and other public-good
components of the industry, such as reserve margins. Free-riding reduces the incentives
to invest, while business-stealing reduces the capacity for financing new investment, es-
pecially in the importing country. This result is important for policy purposes. The issue
of how to collectively finance these essential facilities needs to be addressed upfront. This
is clearly a case where international organizations/agencies can play an important role in
coordinating sustainable level of investment.
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Appendix 1
Since Λ is positive, leaving a rent to the firms is costly. The transferts t1 and t2 are
chosen so that the (IR) constraints are binding. Setting Πi = 0 implies ti = −P (Q)qi +
(θi + γ
qi
2
)qi + K (i = 1, 2). Substituting the transferts value into the global welfare
W = W1 +W2 yields:
W = S(Q)+λP (Q)(q1+ q2)− (1+λ)(θ1+γ q1
2
)q1− (1+λ)(θ2+γ q2
2
)q2−2(1+λ)K (25)
The supra-national regulator maximizes welfare with respect to qi, i ∈ {1, 2}. The first
order condition gives:
(1 + λ)(d− qi(1 + γ)− qj − θi) + qi + qj
2
= 0 (26)
Consider first the interior solution. Solving the system characterized in (26) for i = 1, 2
and letting Λ = λ
1+λ
we obtain:
qi =
d− θ1+θ2
2
1 + Λ + γ
+
θj − θi
2γ
(27)
In this case, the total quantity Q is given by:
Q∗ = q1 + q2 = 2
d− θ1+θ2
2
1 + Λ + γ
We now consider the shut down case qi = 0. This arises when θj − θi ≤ −2(1+2γ)(d−θi)1+Λ .
In this case, only the most efficient firm j is allowed to produce and the total quantity is
given by:
qj = Q
∗ = 2
(d− θj)
1 + 2γ + Λ
If θi < θj , a symmetric condition describes the shut down case for firm j, i 6= j, i.e.
θj−θi ≥ 2(1+2γ)(d−θi)1+Λ . Letting θmin = min{θ1, θ2} and |∆| = |θ2−θ1| = |θ1−θ2|, Equation
(11) resumes the results. Substituting in the inverse demand function (2) we then obtain
the expression for the price.
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Appendix 2
Replacing the participation constraint of the national firm in the welfare function (6), in
the case of open economy welfare in country i writes:
WOi = S(Qi)− P (Qi)qj + λP (Qi)qi − (1 + λ)(θi + γ
qi
2
)qi − (1 + λ)K (28)
Where P (Q) = d− Q
2
and S(Qi) =
∫ Qi
0
P (Q)dQ. Regulator i maximizes (5) with respect
to qi. The first order condition gives:
(1 + λ)(d− θi)− 1
4
[qj(1 + 2λ) + qi(3 + 4λ+ 4γ(1 + λ))] = 0 (29)
Rearranging terms and taking letting Λ = λ
1+λ
, we obtain the reaction function of regu-
lator i to the quantity induced by regulator j (i 6= j), namely qi(qj):
qi(qj) =
4(d− θi)− qj(1 + Λ)
3 + Λ + 4γ
(30)
The equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two best response functions character-
ized in (30) (taking into account that quantities must be non negative). If the intersection
is reached when both quantities are positive, we have:
qi = 4
d− θ1+θ2
2
2(1 + γ) + Λ
+
θj − θi
1 + 2γ
(31)
In this case, the total quantity Q is given by:
Q = q1 + q2 = 4
d− θ1+θ2
2
2(1 + γ) + Λ
However, we also have to consider the shut down case qi = 0. This arises when qj ≥ 4d−θi1+Λ ,
or equivalently ∆ ≥ 2(1+2γ)(d−θi)
1+2γ+Λ
< 0. The shut down case thus writes, for θi > θj :
Q = qj(qi = 0) = 4
d− θj
3 + 4γ + Λ
If θi < θj , a symmetric condition describes the shut down case for firm j, i 6= j. Letting
θmin = min{θ1, θ2} and |∆| = |θ2− θ1| = |θ1− θ2|, the expression for the optimal quantity
is thus reassumed in (14). Substituting in the inverse demand function (2) we then obtain
the expression for the price given in (14).
Appendix 3
Consider country 1 (the same holds for country 2 inverting θ1 and θ2 and replacing ∆
with −∆ in all expressions). Replacing for the participation constraint of the national
firm, welfare in country 1 in the case of closed economy writes:
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WC1 = S(q
C
1 ) + λP (q
C
1 )q
C
1 − (1 + λ)(θ1 + γ
qC1
2
)qC1 − (1 + λ)K (32)
Substituting for the value of the quantities (8) and (14) in (32) and (5) respectively, we
compute the welfare gains from integration WOi −WCi . Rearranging terms we obtain:
WO1 −WC1 = ∆2Λ1 +∆(d− θ1)Λ2 + (d− θ1)2Λ3
Where:
Λ1 =


2
(3+4γ+Λ)2
, if ∆ < −2(1+2γ)(d−θ2)
3+4γ+Λ
;
(1+γ(1−Λ))(3+4γ+Λ)
2(1+2γ)2(1−Λ)(2(1+γ)+Λ)2
, if −2(1+2γ)(d−θ2)
3+4γ+Λ
≤ ∆ ≤ 2(1+2γ)(d−θ1)
3+4γ+Λ
;
0, if ∆ > 2(1+2γ)(d−θ1)
3+4γ+Λ
.
Λ2 =


− 8
(3+4γ+Λ)2
, if ∆ < −2(1+2γ)(d−θ2)
3+4γ+Λ
;
Λ(3+4γ+Λ)
(1+2γ)(1+Λ)(2(1+γ)+Λ)2
, if −2(1+2γ)(d−θ2)
3+4γ+Λ
≤ ∆ ≤ 2(1+2γ)(d−θ1)
3+4γ+Λ
;
0, if ∆ > 2(1+2γ)(d−θ1)
3+4γ+Λ
.
Λ3 =


15+16γ2+4γ(5+3Λ)+Λ(6+5Λ)
2(1−Λ)(1+γ+Λ)(3+4γ+Λ)2
, if ∆ < −2(1+2γ)(d−θ2)
3+4γ+Λ
;
− Λ2
2(1−Λ)(1+γ+Λ)(2(1+γ)+Λ)2
, if −2(1+2γ)(d−θ2)
3+4γ+Λ
≤ ∆ ≤ 2(1+2γ)(d−θ1)
3+4γ+Λ
;
1+3Λ
2(1−Λ)(1+γ+Λ)(3+4γ+Λ)
, if ∆ > 2(1+2γ)(d−θ1)
3+4γ+Λ
.
WO1 −WC1 is a U shaped function of ∆. For Λ = 0, WO1 −WC1 is always non negative,
with a the minimum ∆ = 0, where WO1 −WC1 = 0. For Λ > 0 the minimum is attained in
∆ = −Λ(1+2γ)(d−θ1)
1+γ(1+Λ)
< 0. In this case, in ∆ = 0,WO1 −WC1 = − Λ
2
2(1−Λ)(1+γ+Λ)(2(1+γ)+Λ)2
< 0.
The U shape and the condition |∆| ≤ d ensure the behavior described in Proposition 3.
Appendix 4
We start computing the maximal level of investment Country 1 at the non cooperative
equilibrium. We have:
WO1 = S(Q
O)− P (QO)qO2 + λP (QO)qO1 − (1 + λ)(θ1 + γ
qO1
2
)qO1 − (1 + λ)K
W
OIγ
1 = S(Q
OIγ)− P (QOIγ)qOIγ2 + λP (QOIγ)qOIγ1 − (1 + λ)(θ1 + tγ
q
OIγ
1
2
)q
OIγ
1 − (1 + λ)K − (1 + λ)Iγ
Replacing for the relevant quantities in Equation (20) and rearranging terms we obtain:
IOγ1 = ∆
2Λ′′1 + (d− θ1)∆Λ′′2 + (d− θ1)2Λ′′3
Where:
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Λii1 =
(1 + tγ(1− Λ))(3 + 4tγ + Λ)
(1 + 2tγ)2(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
− (1 + γ(1− Λ))(3 + 4γ + Λ)
(1 + 2γ)2(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
Λii2 =
Λ(3 + 4tγ + Λ)
(1 + 2tγ)(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
− Λ(3 + 4γ + Λ)
(1 + 2γ)(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
Λii3 =
2(1− t)γ(4(1 + γ)(1 + tγ)− Λ)2
(1 + 2tγ)2(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
Λii1 and Λ
ii
2 are positive ∀t ∈ (0, 1),Λ ∈ [0, 1). IOγi is a upward sloping parabola with
axis of symmetry in ∆ = −Λii2 (d−θi)
2Λii1
< 0. This implies the following result:
Result 1 IOγ1 > I
O
γ2 if and only if θ1 < θ2.
Which by definition implies: I
O
γ > I
O
γ .
This result is useful to prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2
Since investment reduces the costs of both firms, if one firm invests, the best response of
the other is not to invest. However, if one firm does not invest, the best response of the
other firm is to invest whenever Iγ < I
O
γi. From Result 1, we know that I
O
γ > I
O
γ . Then,
for IOγ < Iγ < I
O
γ the less efficient firm never invests and the more efficient does. For
Iγ < I
O
γ a firm invests if and only if the other does not.
Before comparing the maximum level of investment I
O
γ with the optimal level I
∗
γ and
the closed economy I
∗
γ , we prove that γ-investment can reduce the welfare of the less
efficient country. We have:
∂IOγ1
∂∆
= 2∆Λii1 + (d− θ1)Λii2 . Then, I
O
γ is strictly positive and
increasing in |∆|, while IOγ is U shaped. The sign of IOγ is thus ambiguous. Let W Iγ1 −W1
be the impact of γ-reducing investment country 1 when ∆ < 0 (i.e. θ2 < θ1). By the
definition of IOγ we can write:
W
Iγ
1 −W1 =
IOγ
1− Λ .
Then, the welfare gains of country 1 are positive if and only if IOγ is positive. In ∆ = 0,
IOγ is positive and decreasing in |∆|. We have to prove that IOγ might be negative for
some ∆ < 0. In ∆ = −2(1+2tγ)(d−θ2)
1+Λ
(the minimal admissible value under A1) W
Iγ
1 −W1
is negative if and only if Λ > Λ =
√
9+8tγ+4γ(10+7tγ+γ(3+γ(1+t))(5+γ(1+t)))−(1+2γ(2+γ(1+t)))
1+2γ
.
Then, Λ > Λ is a sufficient (although non necessary) condition for having the gains in
the less efficient country smaller than zero for some ∆ < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4
The maximal investment at the global optimum is defined by (19). Global welfare in the
case of non investment and investment are respectively:
W ∗ = S(Q∗) + λP (Q∗)(q∗1 + q
∗
2)− (1 + λ)(θ1 + γ
q∗1
2
)q∗1 − (1 + λ)(θ2 + γ
q∗2
2
)q∗2 − 2(1+ λ)K
W ∗Iγ = S(Q∗Iγ ) + λP (Q∗Iγ )(q
∗Iγ
1 + q
∗Iγ
2 )− (1 + λ)(θ1 + tγ
q
∗Iγ
1
2
)q∗1 − (1 + λ)(θ2 + tγ
q
∗Iγ
2
2
)q
∗Iγ
2
−2(1 + λ)K − (1 + λ)Iγ
Replacing for the relevant quantities and rearranging terms we obtain:
I∗γ = ∆
2Λi1 + (d− θmin)|∆|Λi2 + (d− θmin)2Λi3
Where:
Λi1 =
1− t
4γ
[
1
t
+
γ2
(1 + tγ + Λ)(1 + γ + Λ)
]
Λi2 = −
(1− t)γ
(1 + γ + Λ)(1 + tγ + Λ)
Λi3 =
(1− t)γ
(1 + γ + Λ)(1 + tγ + Λ)
I∗γ is symmetric with respect to the origin (∆ = 0), because at the global optimum
production is always reallocated in favor of the most efficient firm. Moreover, for both
∆ > 0 and ∆ < 0 it has an U shape in ∆ (Λi1 > 0, ∀t ∈ (0, 1),Λ ∈ [0, 1)).
We now compare the thresholds I∗γ and I
O
γ .
I∗γ − IOγ = ∆2Λiii1 + (d− θi)∆Λiii2 − (d− θi)2Λiii3
Λiii1 =
1
tγ
+
1
1 + tγ + Λ
− 2(1 + tγ(1− Λ))(3 + 4tγ + Λ)
(2(1 + tγ))(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
−1
γ
− 1
1 + γ + Λ
+
2(1 + γ(1− Λ))(3 + 4γ + Λ)
(2(1 + γ))(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
Λiii2 = −
1
1 + 2tγ
− 1
1 + tγ + Λ
+
4(1 + tγ)2 + Λ
(1 + 2tγ)((2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2)
+
1
1 + 2γ
+
1
1 + γ + Λ
− 4(1 + γ)
2 + Λ
(1 + 2γ)((2(1 + γ) + Λ)2)
Λiii3 =
1
1 + tγ + Λ
− 2(1 + tγ)
(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
− 1
1 + γ + Λ
+
2(1 + γ)
(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
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Λiii1 is positive for all t ∈ (0, 1),Λ ∈ [0, 1). Then, I∗γ − IOγ is a U shaped function of
∆. Moreover, one can easily show that I∗γ − IOγ decreases with Λ. An increase in Λ shifts
the U curve downwards. Than, a sufficient condition for I∗γ − IOγ to be always positive is
to have a positive minimum when Λ = 1. Since I∗γ − IOγ is a convex function of ∆, the
minimum is obtained from the first order condition
∂(I∗γ−I
O
γ )
∂∆
= 0. In Λ = 1, this minimum
is equal to:
[(1 − t)2(57 + 292(1 + t)γ + 252(1 + t(3 + 2t))γ2 + 48(1 + t)(7 + t(12 + 7t))γ3 + 16(5 +
t(33 + t(43 + t(33 + 5t))))γ4 + 28t(1 + t)(1 + t(1 + t))γ5 + 64t2(1 + t2)γ6)]/[t(2 + γ)(2 +
tγ)(1 + 2tγ)2(3 + 2tγ)2(3 + 4γ(2 + γ))] > 0 ∀ t ∈ (0, 1)
Then, I∗γ − IOγ is always positive.
We now show that I∗γ − I
O
γ − IOγ is also positive. If IOγ = 0, then I
O
γ + I
O
γ = I
O
γ and
the result has been proved above. If IOγ > 0, we have:
I
O
γ + I
O
γ = ∆
2Λiv1 + (d− θi)∆Λiv2 + (d− θi)2Λiv3
where:
Λiv1 =
(1− t)γ(3 + 4(γ + tγ(1 + γ))
(1 + 2γ)2(1 + 2tγ)2
− 1 + γ
(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
+
1 + tγ
(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
Λiv2 = −
4(1− t)γ(4(1 + γ)(1 + tγ)− Λ2)
(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
Λiv3 =
4(1− t)γ(4(1 + γ)(1 + tγ)− Λ2)
(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
Then,
I∗γ − I
O
γ − IOγ = ∆2Λv1 + (d− θi)∆Λv2 − (d− θi)2Λv3
where:
Λv1 =
1 + γ
(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
− 1 + tγ
(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
− 1
4(1 + γ + Λ)
+
1
4(1 + tγ + Λ)
− 1
4γ(1 + 2γ)2
+
1
4tγ(1 + 2tγ)2
Λv2 =
1
(1 + γ + Λ)
− 1
(1 + tγ + Λ)
+
4(1 + γ)
(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
− 4(1 + tγ)
(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
Λv3 =
(1− t)γΛ24(1 + t(1 + t))γ2 + 4(1 + t)γ(3 + 2Λ) + (2 + Λ)(6 + 5Λ)
(1 + γ + Λ)(1 + tγ + Λ)(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)2
Λv1 is positive ∀t,Λ ∈ (0, 1), then I∗γ−IJγ is a convex U-shaped function of ∆. Moreover,
one can verify that the difference I∗γ − IJγ is decreasing with Λ. Then, the difference is
minimal in Λ = 0, where:
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I∗γ − I
O
γ − IOγ =
γ(1 + 2γ)2 − tγ(1 + 2tγ)2
4γ(1 + 2γ)2(1 + 2tγ)2
> 0, ∀ t ∈ (0, 1)
Then, I∗γ − I
O
γ − IOγ is always positive.
Appendix 5
In the case of closed economy, welfare with no investment is given by (32). If Iγ is
invested, the welfare function becomes:
W
CIγ
i = S(q
CIγ
i ) + λP (q
CIγ
i )− (1 + λ)(θi + tγ
qCi
2
)q
CIγ
i − (1 + λ)K − (1 + λ)Iγ
Then, replacing for the expression for the quantities and using equation (22), the
maximal investment regulator i is willing to under closed economy can be written:
ICγi =
(1− t)γ(d− θi)2
2(1 + γ + Λ)(1 + tγ + Λ)
We first check that ICγ is smaller than I
∗
γ . Because I
∗
γ is a convex function of ∆,
while ICγ is constant, I
O
γ − ICγ is also convex in ∆. In particular, it attains a minimum in
∆ = 2tγ
2(d−θi)
2tγ2+(1+t)γ(1+Λ)+(1+Λ2)
where its value is:
(1 + t)γ(d− θi)2(1 + Λ)(1 + γ(1 + t) + Λ)
2(1 + γ + Λ)(1 + tγ + Λ)(2tγ + (1 + t)γ(1 + Λ)(1 + γ)2)
> 0
Then, IOγ − ICγ is always positive.
We now compare IOγ and I
C
γ . Because I
O
γ is increasing and convex, while I
C
γ is constant,
IOγ − ICγ is also increasing and convex in ∆. In particular, if Λ = 0:
IOγ − ICγ =
(1− t)γ(11 + 4γ(3(2 + γ) + t(3 + 4γ)(2 + γ(1 + t))))
8(1 + γ)(1 + tγ)(1 + 2γ)2(1 + 2tγ)2
∆2 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ (0, 1)
Then, for Λ = 0, the minimum is attained in ∆ = 0, and IOγ − ICγ is increasing with |∆|.
On the other hand, if Λ > 0 and ∆ = 0:
IOγ −ICγ = −
1
2
(1−t)γ(d−θi)2
[
1
(1 + tγ + Λ)
− 1
(1 + γ + Λ)
+
4(1 + tγ)
(2(1 + tγ) + Λ)
− 4(1 + γ)
(2(1 + γ) + Λ)
]
This is negative for all t ∈ (0, 1),Λ ∈ [0, 1). From the increasing shape of IOγ , there
exists ∆ˆ > 0 such that for all ∆ > ∆ˆ, IOγ > I
C
γ .
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The maximal levels of investment are derived with the same methodology used in Ap-
pendix 4 for the case of γ-investment. We have:
I∗θ =
(1− c)θ1
[
d− (1+c)θ1
2
+ (1 + Λ)
(
∆
2γ
+ (1−c)θ1
4γ
)]
1 + γ + Λ
ICθ =
(1− c)θ1
[
d− (1+c)θ1
2
]
1 + γ + Λ
IOθ =
(1− c)θ1
[(
d− (1+c)θ1
2
)
(4 + 8γ2 + (3 + Λ)(Λ + 4γ)) +
[
∆
1+2γ
+ (1−c)θ1
2(1+2γ)
]
(1 + Λ)(3 + 4γ + Λ)
]
(1 + 2γ)(2(1 + γ) + Λ)2
Then, I∗θ > I
C
θ if and only if:
∆ > ∆ˆ1 = −(1− c)θ1
2
−
[
d− (1 + c)θ1
2
]
Γ1(Λ, γ)
Where:
Γ1(Λ, γ) =
2Λγ(1 + 2γ)(3 + 4γ2 + Λ(3 + Λ + γ(7 + 3Λ))
(1 + Λ)(8γ4 + (2 + λ)2 + 2γ(3 + Λ)2 + γ3(26 + 6Λ) + 2γ2(16 + Λ(7 + Λ)))
I∗θ > I
O
θ if and only if:
∆ > ∆ˆ2 = −(1− c)θ1
2
IOθ > I
O
θ if and only if:
∆ > ∆ˆ3 = −(1− c)θ1
2
+
[
d− (1 + c)θ1
2
]
Γ2(Λ, γ)
Where:
Γ2(Λ, γ) =
Λ(1 + 2γ)(3 + 4γ2 + Λ(3 + Λ + γ(7 + 3Λ)))
(1 + Λ)(1 + γ)(1 + γ + Λ)(3 + 4γ + Λ)
It is easy to see that, if Λ = 0, ∆ˆ1 = ∆ˆ2 = ∆ˆ3 = − (1−c)θ12 < 0. Moreover, for all Λ > 0,
∆ˆ1 < ∆ˆ2 < ∆ˆ3. Finally, ∆ˆ1 decreases in Λ while ∆ˆ3 increases. For Λ large enough, ∆ˆ3 is
always positive.
39
